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1 Introduction 
In the present context of the European Union (EU) it seems decidedly disingenuous to 
invoke the term spatial planning. The talk of the town, certainly since the Commission 
has published and stakeholders have widely discussed the 'Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion' (CEC 2008) is of territorial cohesion. As against territorial cohesion, by 
common agreement spatial planning is said not to be a competence of the EU. However, 
the spatial planning that the EU wants no part of is the function of a body of govern-
ment with a legal mandate – what in EU terms is called a competence – to control de-
velopment, usually with reference to a statutory land-use plan, but in the UK case taking 
account also of any other material considerations.  
The meaning of words is not cast in stone but depends on who is using them when 
and why. Thus, whereas the EU presently has reasons – to be discussed – not to invoke 
the term spatial planning, the present author has reasons to do so. After all, planners 
often entertain a broader view of spatial planning that is compatible with the concept of 
territorial cohesion. It is the view of spatial planning as the formulation of integrated 
strategic spatial frameworks to guide public as well as private action. This puts spatial 
planning more in the context of governance than government where mutual understand-
ing and commitment are as important as statutory powers. Seen in this light, there could 
be no objection against calling the emergent EU practice, about which more below, 
European spatial planning rather than, as is the present practice, territorial cohesion pol-
icy.  
In fact, speaking to the ministers of spatial planning discussing the European Spatial 
Development Perspective (ESDP) at Madrid in 1995, the then Commissioner for re-
gional policy, Monika Wulf-Mathies, did use the term spatial planning, arguing that this 
was implied in the EU policy to strengthen economic and social cohesion. She argued 
that this merely needed to be clarified in the pending reform of the European treaties, 
                                                 
1 This paper is an earlier version of the following paper published in revised form: Faludi, A. (2010): Centenary 
paper: European spatial planning: Past, present and future. In: Town Planning Review 81,1, 1-22. 
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eventually resulting in the Treaty of Amsterdam coming into operation in 1997. It was 
only after the refusal of member states to recognise that this was so that the Commission 
switched to invoking the concept of territorial cohesion in the early-2000s.  
The point of reminding the reader of this episode is not to prove all those who prefer 
to talk about territorial cohesion rather than spatial planning wrong. There is no right or 
wrong in such matters. The use of words depends on context and on intentions. The 
Commission's intention has been to break out of the impasse concerning a Community 
competence for spatial planning by shifting the discussion into the arena of cohesion 
policy. The author's intention is to retain the link with spatial planning and the relevant 
academic literature. That's all there is to it. 
There is much discussion about what territorial cohesion is, also in the consultations 
on the Green Paper that have ended in February 20092. This is not surprising. Waterhout 
(2008) (see also Faludi 2006) sees territorial cohesion as an umbrella for the pursuit of 
balanced development, competitiveness, sustainability and good territorial governance. 
The first three are concerns shared with other policy areas. Territorial governance is the 
unique selling point of territorial cohesion policy. The focus is on what in EU jargon is 
called the coherence of sector policies as they affect territories. Territorial cohesion thus 
requires such policies to be integrated. Such integration is, of course, the aim also of 
spatial planning. Wulf-Mathies talked about European spatial planning in precisely this 
sense, and so did the ESDP (CEC 1999). One may thus say that under the guise of EU 
territorial cohesion policy European spatial planning is coming of age, but in the process 
the leopard has changed its spots: It no longer relies on statutory land-use plans. The 
preferred mode is cooperation in formulating joint strategies or visions of various kinds.  
The purpose and mode of European spatial planning/territorial cohesion policy are 
thus encapsulated in three 'Cs': cohesion, coherence, cooperation. With its emphasis on 
cooperation rather than authoritative decision-making, territorial cohesion policy be-
longs to the realm of governance rather than government. Conceived of as statutory 
land-use planning – a narrow view of what it entails – spatial planning belongs to the 
realm of government, with as always elements of governance present in the process of 
making them. 
It is useful to dwell somewhat longer on the difference as against land-use planning. 
Traditionally, the planning vehicle for achieving coherence has been the land-use plan. 
In the mid-20th century, the Schuster Report in the UK spelled out the assumptions 
(Committee on the Qualification of Planners 1950: 13): 
 that for nearly all its activities the community depends on land and that land in Brit-
ain is severely limited in relation to the demand made on it, and 
 that the location of development, particularly industrial, can have a profound effect 
on social, economic and strategic issues.  
Schuster continued by saying that, in preparing and implementing the statutory plan, 
local planning authorities needed to conform to the government's emergent regional 
policy, as well as pay regard to their own social, economic and strategic policies (Com-
mittee on the Qualification of Planners 1950: 15). Other than town planners at the time, 
Schuster and his committee did not see this as a matter of design, as the setting out of a 
fixed pattern of physical features. Rather, the "process of arranging a pattern for com-
                                                 
2 For the many contributions of the stakeholders see the website of DG Regio: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ 
consultation/terco/contrib_en.htm. 
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munities must be continuous and constantly adapted to changing conditions" (Commit-
tee on the Qualification of Planners 1950: 20). The essence was to arrive at a synthesis – 
coherence! However, the vehicle was a statutory land-use plan called the development 
plan under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act.  
The statutory land-use plan has lost its exclusive role since. This is reflected in the 
rise to prominence of spatial rather than town and country planning in the UK. The term 
had its origins in Euro-English, meaning non-British concepts conveyed in English 
words (Williams 1996: 57). In the process of transferring concepts from one context to 
the other, misunderstanding is inevitable. Thus, spatial planning comes from the Ger-
man Raumplanung and the Dutch ruimtelijke planning, but in both those contexts the 
term connotes the preparation of statutory plans, so much so that planners now prefer 
the term spatial development. As against this in the UK, where under the Thatcher and 
Major governments town and country planning had a restrictive meaning, spatial plan-
ning has acquired a progressive connotation. It is thus used symbolically to mark a 
break from the recent past in terms of what planning has come to suggest: a more inte-
grative and holistic approach. Indeed, referring to the RTPI's 'A New Vision for Plan-
ning' (RTPI 2001), Allmendinger and Haughton (2009: 620) signal a "shift from, 
broadly, regulatory planning to 'spatial planning'. While definitions of what constitutes 
spatial planning are diverse (...) there is a broad agreement that it involves a focus on 
the qualities and management of space and place". This is also why 'place-making' is 
being used as a new term. Indeed, in its reaction to the Green Paper, the UK government 
claims that what in EU parlance goes under territorial cohesion is place-making. 
Adding for good measure the element, mentioned above, of governance to the equa-
tion, Allmendinger and Haughton (2009: 620): "With their clear focus on localities, 
planners arguably have a key role to play in bringing a clearer spatial dimension to the 
integration of a wide variety of policy sectors". Indeed, many authors (Albrechts 2001; 
Albrechts/Healey/Kunzmann 2003; Healey 2007; Wiechmann 2008) see spatial visions 
as the preferred vehicle for spatial planning.  
The shift from government to governance indicates the state doing more than engag-
ing in imperative coordination. It stands for developing "mechanisms and strategies of 
coordination adopted in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence among opera-
tionally autonomous actors, organizations, and functional systems" (Jessop 2004: 52). 
This forms the occasion to reiterate a point made above which is that governance puts 
into focus the need for cooperation between a multitude of public and private actors. 
Planning has brought this into practice even before governance has become a term of 
good currency. In this respect, it was ahead of its time, but where it relies on statutory 
plans, planning remains stuck in the context of government. 
2 Structure of the paper 
After this introduction dealing with basic concepts, the paper traces the interplay be-
tween the pursuit of cohesion, coherence and cooperation in the European planning 
arena. The three stages identified in the development of the EU by Keeler (2005) serve 
as a framework: the launch era when the Treaty of Rome was coming into operation; the 
doldrums era after the 'empty chair crisis' provoked by French President Charles De 
Gaulle bringing with it stagnation of integration, and the boom era after the Single 
European Act until the Maastricht Treaty. Without saying so in so many words, Hooghe 
and Marks (2008) invoking Keeler's periodisation add a fourth era: the present crisis of 
politicisation and national boundary reconstruction. This crisis could not fail to impact 
upon the arena in which spatial planning/territorial cohesion is being discussed, where 
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six net-contributors have put on the table the renationalization of cohesion policy 
(Bachtler/Mendez 2007). Jessop (2004: 68) relates the crisis to the shift from the 
Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workforce post-national regime focusing on 
permanent innovation and subordinating social policy to the demands of the labour 
market. Policy making is shifting in all directions, in addition to which there is the shift 
to governance. The Europolity is thus an "integral moment in the de-nationalization of 
the state, the de-statization of politics, and the internationalization of regimes – without 
being the highest level to which national state powers are shifted upwards, at which new 
forms of partnership are being organized, or on which the internationalization of policy 
regimes is occurring". This creates uncertainty and disorientation, with the public and 
thus governments reacting defensively, availing themselves of opportunities, like refer-
enda on European treaties, to voice their disquiet.  
The paper discusses each of the four eras – launch era; the doldrums; the boom era; 
the crisis – with a focus on the role of European spatial planning/territorial cohesion 
policy. It shows that spatial or territorial issues have been recognised to be inherent to 
European integration from the start, leading to the, albeit halting development of an 
implicit spatial or territorial cohesion policy long before, thanks to its vice president at 
the time, the president of the French region of Limousin Robert Savy, the Association of 
European Regions invented the concept of territorial cohesion in 1995. In fact, ever 
since the early 1960s, the Commission has been seeking to render this policy more ex-
plicit and effective. Often though, member states have either ignored its arguments alto-
gether or, where there have been agreements in principle, sought to weaken the policy 
during implementation. This tug-of-war, sometimes amounting to a guerrilla against the 
Commission, is but a reflection of the ambiguity of the European construct: A creation 
of the member states, the EU is nevertheless regarded with suspicion. 
As regards this implicit territorial policy (operating among others through area desig-
nations for the Structural Funds and through their programming) bringing spatial plan-
ners with their specific skills and hang-ups into the process, the ESDP has been a side 
show, and the competence issue which it raised – yet another instance of the ambiguity 
of the European construct – a nuisance. Although a side show, the ESDP has not been 
unimportant, though. It was and is bringing actors together and it has potential for the 
future, but it is still secondary to the main thing, which is the so far implicit territorial 
cohesion policy of the EU. However, if and when the institutional issue of the position 
of territorial cohesion policy in the European construct will be resolved, the specific 
skills of planners: spatial analysis and spatial positioning, will be useful. 
There will be conclusions reflecting also on fundamental issues. For planners, they 
offer a hopeful perspective: Conceived as the formulation of spatial strategies, spatial 
planning can become a vehicle, not only for territorial cohesion, but for formulating EU 
policy generally. And, even if under the territorial cohesion label, interest in spatial 
planning is bound to increase.   
3 The launch era 
As indicated, this concerns the Treaty of Rome and its immediate follow-up. There were 
attempts to make spatial planning part of the embryonic European project. Already be-
fore the Second World War, albeit on a modest scale, planning conferences and ex-
changes had taken place. Planning in the US – metropolitan park systems and of course 
the Tennessee Valley Authority – and the UK – garden cities and later the green belt – 
had become sources of inspiration for Northwest European planners, generally the 
pacemakers in European spatial planning. Their vanguard had been contemplating spa-
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tial planning on the national and, in a few instances, even the international scale. Plan-
ners in the Third Reich, too, had been thinking big and, as pernicious war aims had 
seemed to come within reach, had been swarming out to harness resources for an ex-
ploitative kind of European planning.  
The war had brought much destruction and a newly conceived regional policy, also 
described as industrialization policy, became common (Vanhove/Klaassen 1980; Drevet 
2008). The European Coal and Steel Community in fact pursued an industrialization 
policy. Issues of urban growth management were expected to arise in the hotspots of 
coal and steel production, so planners wanted to be on board. 
The Dutch were a major force in this. Industrialization policy in The Netherlands was 
not under their control, but managing urban growth in this densely populated corner of 
Europe was their province. So they wanted to coordinate industrial development, along-
side with other sector policies, by means of an overall national spatial plan. Regarding a 
statutory plan as the vehicle of achieving coherence, Dutch planners at the time thus 
thought like Schuster. They also positioned their urban agglomerations in their Euro-
pean context. With an eye on the Atlantic Seaboard of the US, they painted the scenario 
of a future megacity stretching from the Western Netherlands to the Ruhr Area and the 
Belgian urban agglomeration. Like in The Netherlands where the rapid development of 
the west of the country was a challenge for planners, they and their international col-
leagues stipulated a technical planning imperative. There was an added incentive: Euro-
pean institutions embracing planning would improve their standing nationally. It is safe 
to assume that what planners had in mind was for Europe formulating some form of, 
albeit broad plan for which a supra-national competence was required, but then the 
planners concerned, in particular those from The Netherlands, were early European en-
thusiasts. 
The small group of European planners – with South Europeans largely absent from 
these debates, but then the Italians were the only ones who were members of the Euro-
pean Economic Community – discovered quickly that they were pursuing different 
planning ideas. As indicated, the Dutch and also the German planners saw a land-use 
plan, albeit on a large scale and thus fairly general in nature, as the vehicle for squaring 
the imperatives of economic development with the preservation of open space and of 
enhancing amenity. France as against this pursued aménagement du territoire, the gen-
erative metaphor being that of "Paris and the French desert" (Paris et le désert français; 
Gravier 1947; see also Vanhove/Klaassen 1980; Baudelle 2008). However, the French 
planning vehicle of choice was not a statutory plan. Rather, the Jacobin state gave direct 
funding for projects designed to smooth out spatial imbalances. In European spatial 
planning the French view – suitably modified to suit the context of France as the decen-
tralized state that the country has become since – rather than the Dutch and German 
view prevails. Regarding it quite rightly as much the same as aménagement du terri-
toire, France is sympathetic, therefore, to EU territorial cohesion policy. The point is, 
with its French roots, under this flag European spatial planning is not, and will not be-
come, regulatory land-use planning.  
At the beginning, there was no immediate need for the emergent European planning 
community to resolve any such differences between planning traditions. The community 
had to be held together. The European Economic Community was in the process of be-
ing set up, and the Spaak Report, called after the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri 
Spaak, which laid the foundations of the Treaty of Rome, recommended setting up an 
investment fund to promote balanced development – the French view. Before then, the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community had already foreseen in 
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such positive measures, co-financed by national governments, in regions where its poli-
cies would lead to the down-scaling of industry. As Husson (2002: 25) recounts, the 
High Authority had dealt with industrial conversion in the Hainaut Region of Belgium 
decades before the European Community invoked such policies.  
The Spaak Report highlighted the need also for coordination between existing and fu-
ture regional plans and those plans due to be developed by Common Market institutions 
(Pierret 1984: 32). In other words, from the word go two of the rationales for European 
spatial planning/territorial cohesion policy, balanced development and good territorial 
governance – cohesion and coherence – were on the wish list. This was based on the 
recognition that the removal of customs barriers would change the economic geography 
of Europe, but this was certainly not a call for a European land-use plan.  
In 1957 the signatories of the Treaty of Rome went no further, though, than declaring 
in the preamble that they were "[a]nxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and 
to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions", and in Article 2 
giving the European Economic Community the task of "reducing the differences exist-
ing in various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured" (EEC 
Treaty 1957). Under discretionary powers given to it, the Commission granted tempo-
rary relief in some cases – mainly in the Italian Mezzogiorno – from implementing 
measures to complete the, as it was then called, Common Market (Pierret 1984: 32-34), 
but no positive measures were taken. As indicated, Italy was the odd one out, and Italian 
calls for an active regional policy were ignored (Drevet 2008). 
Spatial planners were largely absent in the debates leading to the Treaty of Rome. 
The only ones known to have expressed an interest were the Dutch. They dreamed of 
the European Economic Community getting involved in the kind of spatial planning that 
they were propagating for The Netherlands. This was the result of personal initiative: 
One of the Dutch negotiators and co-signatory of the Treaty of Rome, Johannes 
Linthorst Homan, a member of the European Movement, had previously been chairman 
of the Dutch national planning commission. He was to be disappointed by the lack of 
attention to spatial planning.  
4 In the doldrums 
The doldrums refers to the area of stagnation caused by the 'empty chairs crisis', to be 
discussed below. European planning, too, was in a period of gestation in which in one 
form or another, Dutch national planners and a select group of their peers in neighbour-
ing countries continued to explore options. They participated vigorously in a conference 
of the regions of North-West Europe which they had helped setting up. Sponsored by 
national and regional planning establishments, this conference met regularly until the 
mid-1990s by which time most founding fathers had left the scene. In the 1960s, it did 
pioneering work, collecting data, mapping the European territory and formulating veri-
table transnational spatial planning proposals, with the Collège de l'Europe at Bruges 
sponsored by the European Movement providing support. Some of this found its way 
into Dutch national planning documents which, invoking data etc. provided by the per-
manent conference continued to position the country in its wider context. The prospect 
of the Channel Tunnel and the changes which this mega project would bring to the ge-
ography of this corner of Europe aroused much interest, too. 
There were murmurings of the need of a European planning agency, but of course to 
no avail. The Benelux Economic Union was more receptive to the idea of planning 
reaching beyond national boundaries, but it was to take until 1986 before it published its 
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first Structural Outline Sketch – the first ever official transnational document. Cross-
border cooperation was another concern of the Benelux. In 1967, Germany and The 
Netherlands also set up a joint planning commission which still continues to operate. 
There are other well-known examples of cross-border planning, like the Regio Basilien-
sis, a private initiative, and the prototypical Euregio straddling the Dutch and German 
border antedating cross-border and transnational planning under the Community initia-
tive INTERREG.  
Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Assembly – forerunner of the European Parliament – 
heard pleas for the European Economic Community to engage in regional policy in 
1961. It adopted a resolution, authored by a Dutch representative, the aim being to help 
less developed regions and also to arrive at a reasonable division of labour between the 
territories of the Community and to counteract the manifest tendency towards over-
concentration in more or less all member states. One can read into this the rationales for, 
and preferred mode of European spatial planning: cohesion, coherence and cooperation.  
The 1961 resolution also invited the Commission to organise a conference. Its First 
Vice-President, Robert Marjolin (a former close collaborator of Jean Monnet) chaired 
this 'Conference on the Regional Economies', with Commission President Walter Hall-
stein giving an opening speech spelling out the rationale of a common regional policy in 
terms that sound remarkably modern. As Husson (2002) reports (see also Drevet 2008: 
47), there was even talk of asking the Commission to study the proposition of an amé-
nagement du territoire européen – European spatial planning.  
The rapporteur, Georges Pierret (1984: 36) from the Bretagne, recounts Marjolin as 
the second speaker having put his finger on the key issue: The highly developed core 
benefitting more from the Common Market than peripheral regions, a key concern right 
up to the present. Pierret describes the follow-up, the Commission making proposals 
(see also Vanhove/Klaassen 1980; Drevet 2008: 47) to the Council of Ministers in 1965. 
However, shortly before President Charles De Gaulle had instigated the 'policy of the 
empty chair' causing the European Economic Community to enter the doldrums. His 
aim was to curtail a Commission that in his eyes was arrogating to it rights of the mem-
ber states. The Marjolin initiative for the European Economic Community to become 
active in the area of regional policy could not have come at a worse moment! In fact it 
seems to have contributed to neither Hallstein nor Marjolin receiving a second term 
(Pierret 1984: 39). The 'empty chairs crisis' itself ended with the 'Luxembourg Com-
promise' giving member states a veto in all cases where a Council decision is purported 
to pose as threat to vital national interests. European integration became less dynamic 
than its advocates had hoped for.  
During this period, the Commission – always good for taking initiatives that would 
increase its sway over the member states – continued to study regional policy issues, 
forming even a directorate-general for this purpose. It formulated what amounts to a 
rationale of continuing validity for European spatial planning/territorial cohesion policy. 
It is that European integration implies a recomposition of European territory and thus its 
rethinking on an appropriate geographical level. Thus, any regional policy should be 
conceived, not only from national, but also a European perspective. Thus, like in 
France, European regional policy must improve the allocation of public funds to combat 
excessive concentration (Drevet 2008: 46).  
Funding for European regional policy became available only in the mid-1970s. De 
Gaulle had left the scene, opening the way for the United Kingdom, together with Den-
mark and Ireland, to join in 1972. The UK could not profit from the Common Agricul-
tural Policy in proportion to its contribution. It could do with assistance, though, for 
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declining industrial areas. So to compensate the UK, a regional policy of sorts was in-
troduced. Drevet (2008) mocks it for being neither regional nor communautarian but a 
mere financial transfer to national governments to support whatever regional policy they 
wished to pursue. This restricted role of regional policy only changed when Jacques 
Delors introduced a programmatic approach, experimented with in the prior Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), and modelled on the evolving French regional pol-
icy. The IMPs were particularly influential. They involved local stakeholders, an inno-
vative practice diametrically opposed to previous regional initiatives of the central state. 
The approach has become a hallmark of EU cohesion policy since. Being located in the 
Mediterranean space of the now enlarged European Community, the IMPs inevitably 
meant more influence than before for South European thinking. But this was not in the 
area of spatial planning as such. Rather, the influence concerned governance issues.  
Meanwhile, the Council of Europe, set up in 1949, with the European Convention of 
Human Rights its most important achievement, offered an alternative avenue for Euro-
pean planners to argue their case. Indeed, thinking about European planning shifted to 
this arena. Not only regional economic, but also spatial planners participated. Overcon-
centration of population and regional disparities posed economic as well as middle-
down-the-road planning problems. The Council of Europe passed a resolution in 1961 
pointing at the spatial dimension of human rights. "Harmonious geographical develop-
ment" – cohesion – was thus considered a task for European institutions (Déjeant-Pons 
2003). In 1964, the Council of Europe set up a working party which published 'Regional 
Planning a European Problem' (CoE 1968). Importantly, regional planning as conceived 
by the working party was not restricted to planning by any regional level of govern-
ment. Region was a generic term referring to any kind of area. So regional planning 
stood for spatial planning.  
Set up jointly with the European Conference of Local Authorities, the working party 
provided a fully-fledged analysis of, and a programme for, regional (spatial) planning in 
Europe, also at the level of the European Economic Community. The participation of 
local authorities was important. In the context of the European Economic Community, 
subnational authorities were not sitting at the negotiating table. The majority of the 
member states were still centralised and saw no need to involve them. From the per-
spective of the Bretagne, Pierret (1984; 1997) gives a vivid picture of the struggles be-
tween regional lobbies and the French central bureaucracy. The Council of Europe pro-
vided an outlet for articulating the concerns of subnational authorities3.  
The report of the working party recounted the failed attempt of the Commission, in 
pursuance of the initiative above by the Parliamentary Assembly, to get approval from 
the Council of Ministers for any form of such a policy. It also reported the establishment 
of a Regional Policy Directorate, initially merely to study regional issues, in the Com-
mission. The main recommendation of the report was directed at the Council of Europe 
itself. It pointed out the danger of the bifurcation of the European continent. It was after 
all the unique selling point of the Council of Europe that it assembled all countries or in 
any case those west of the Iron Curtain:  
"Everybody is aware how serious it would be if co-operation in the field of regional 
planning, like co-operation in other fields, were to split Europe in two or be left to 
'Smaller Europe'. How could one leave out 'strategically' countries such as Switzerland, 
                                                 
3 The Committee of the Regions would only be set up after the Treaty of Maastricht came into operation in 1993. 
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which 'guards' the Alpine passes, Austria, which is the crossroads of relations with East-
ern European countries, Denmark, which links us with the Scandinavian countries, or 
indeed the United Kingdom at a time when the Channel tunnel is no longer a utopian 
dream. 
It would seem therefore that, in the present state of European co-operation, the Coun-
cil of Europe might provide the framework – geographically the most appropriate – for 
a European Conference of Ministers responsible for regional planning." (CoE 1968: 88). 
So the working party proposed, and the Council of Europe agreed to, setting up this 
conference. The resolution referred to regional planning as an important field of inter-
governmental co-operation, one of the "main axes of development of the European soci-
ety of tomorrow", and one of the Council's four most important fields of action. (CoE 
1968: 90)  
The working party made no recommendations as to the shape and operation of the 
proposed conference. Importantly, because the Council of Europe had no supra-national 
powers, regional planning was defined as an 'intergovernmental' task, one that the gov-
ernments concerned should tackle jointly. This notion was to become important later 
when on German instigation the ESDP, too, was defined in such terms.  
Germany hosted the first meeting of this permanent conference in 1970. It became 
known by its French acronym as CEMAT (Conférence Européenne des Ministres res-
ponsable de l'aménagement du territoire). CEMAT produced numerous publications 
and a 'European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter', also known as the Torremolinos 
Charter (CoE 1984) and a series of publications before and after. This was a high point 
in European spatial planning during the period characterised here as the doldrums be-
cause of the lack of any real action. Prepared by a 'Committee of senior officials', the 
Charter identified common planning principles: balanced social-economic development, 
quality of life, responsible management of nature and the environment and a rational use 
of land. Beyond this, the Charter underlined the right of citizens to participate and un-
derscored the importance of horizontal and vertical coordination. One sees once again 
the themes of cohesion, coherence and cooperation reflected in the Charter. On this ba-
sis, the ministers decided to propose a European regional planning strategy.  
However, two CEMAT meetings further down the line, in 1988 at Lausanne, a draft 
written by an enthusiastic expert from Luxembourg did not even get a hearing. Due to 
cost-savings, the Council of Europe had curtailed the activities of CEMAT. In the mar-
gins of Lausanne, the Dutch and the French minister attending decided to shift the dis-
cussion to the arena of the European Community, then undergoing its revival under 
Jacques Delors. As a follow-up to the EDSP in which this initiative eventually issued, 
CEMAT would adopt the 'Guiding Principles for the Sustainable Development of the 
European Continent' (CoE 2002) generalizing ESDP principles to apply to the whole of 
Europe rather than the EU15. 
In parallel to CEMAT, the European Parliament, as the Parliamentary Assembly was 
called since its members had been directly elected, continued its lobby for planning. A 
major initiative came from a member from the Walloon Region of Belgium, Paul-Henry 
Gendebien. His report invited the European Commission "to implement an overall 
European regional planning policy which will give expression to the political determi-
nation to effectively administer and to preserve the territory of Europe as a common 
domain" (Gendebien 1983: 6). Once again, it is clear from the context that what is 
meant is a form of European spatial planning.  
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This policy should go beyond doling out support to disadvantaged regions. Three ob-
jectives were stipulated: coordination of existing Community measures, promoting bal-
anced and integrated regional development, pursuing a proactive policy to guarantee the 
lasting survival of the European heritage. As will become evident, this is remarkably 
like the ESDP guidelines. It is also like what the Torremolinos Charter has said and 
represents the best thinking at the time, with continuing validity in the 21st century.  
Gendebien also set out the procedures to be followed and proposed the formation of a 
unit under the responsibility of one of the Commissioners. His report gave a compre-
hensive analysis of the rationale and the historical and legal context, on the way de-
bunking the argument that the European Community did not possess a competence in 
the matter by pointing out that  
 regional and environmental policy were not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of 
Rome either but had been set up under its Article 232, and 
 the Community already pursued a many-faceted de-facto regional planning policy 
which only needed to be rendered more transparent and effective. 
When the European Commission did not respond – the European Parliament had less 
clout than today – the European Parliament passed two further resolutions. In a presen-
tation to the Committee on Regional Policy and Regional Planning of the European Par-
liament in 1986, the chairman of CEMAT, a position held at the time by the Dutch 
planning minister, advocated for both the European Community as well as the Council 
of Europe, each in its own area of responsibility, to engage in spatial planning.  
As far as the European Community was concerned, this was still to no avail. This was 
why, as mentioned, at the CEMAT meeting at Lausanne, the Dutch minister (not the 
same one who had spoken at the European Parliament but his successor) and his French 
counterpart decided to take yet another initiative, one that was to change the course of 
events. By that time, the Single European Act had become a fact.  
The doldrums era has seen the articulation of the rationale for European spatial plan-
ning as a response to issues that were inherent to the very project of European integra-
tion. The Commission, with the European Parliament and the Council of Europe in the 
wings, took many initiatives which the member states either ignored or – as with the 
European Regional Development Fund – tried to stifle respectively to bring back into 
the national fold, like when moneys from the Community coffers were in fact used to 
subsidise state budgets rather than to pursue agreed common objectives. The ambigui-
ties of the European construct – member states agreeing to give the Community institu-
tions a role, only to judiciously curtail the pursuit of common objectives afterwards – 
became only too apparent.  
5 The boom era 
At the end of the doldrums era, one can thus fairly say that a veritable European spatial 
planning programme in statum nascendi existed. Coinciding with the two terms, from 
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, of Jacques Delors as President of the European Com-
mission, the subsequent boom era inexorably raised the question of the role of this pro-
gramme in relation to Community policies, in particular to cohesion policy under the 
Single European Act. Cohesion policy as such became serious business. After all, the 
'cohesion countries' Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland had made acceptance of the 
Single Market and the European Monetary Union contingent upon a doubling of the 
Structural Funds and the addition of a Cohesion Fund. They had re-iterated what had 
European Spatial Planning 
 19
already been a rationale for proposing European regional policy, the fact that countries 
in the core stood to benefit disproportionately from integration, and that the others 
needed assistance in order to be able to compete.  
Spatial planning became an, albeit controversial part of this cohesion policy. This 
came about as a result of the French-Dutch initiative on which the two ministers had 
come to an agreement at Lausanne in 1988. Although coming from different planning 
traditions, the two initiators shared a common purpose: to give an explicit spatial di-
mension to Community policies, but not by way of statutory land-use planning. To the 
French, statutory planning had never occurred, and since 1965, at national level in any 
case, the Dutch, too, had abrogated the idea of a statutory plan, replacing it with indica-
tive spatial policies instead which in albeit modified form could conceivably be formu-
lated at Community level, too. Subsequent events would show that other countries, like 
Germany, were less relaxed about this possibility, an attitude that finally carried the day 
and led to member state reluctance to allow the Community, led by the Commission, to 
proceed in this direction. Germany claimed, and eventually all countries including The 
Netherlands agreed, that there existed no community competence in the matter. 
This related to unresolved business. It was no accident that the Torremolinos Charter 
had been called the 'European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter'. It combined the con-
cern for balanced development with one for the rational use of land. The latter sug-
gested that, as is the case in many countries, a land-use plan should be the vehicle for 
planning. As the reader knows, this was not, however, the idea behind French amé-
nagement du territoire, which happened to be what the initiators of the next round of 
discussions had in mind when they raised the issue of European spatial planning. One 
cannot imagine for the participants on both sides to have been ill-informed about each 
other's way of thinking about planning, but unfortunately neither side could break the 
mould of its own tradition and established views.  
Led by the Germans, the majority of the member states thus saw planning as a part of 
the sovereign control of nation-states over their territory. The French initiators, includ-
ing French Commission officials, supported by the Dutch had been after something else: 
an agreed strategic spatial framework for improving the governance of the Structural 
Funds. That framework might influence the management of funding programmes, but it 
would never take the form of a land-use plan of any description. Land-use planning 
could safely be left to the member states and their subnational authorities.   
The first French initiative in this episode related to the regulations pertaining to the 
European Regional Development Fund. It allowed the Commission to formulate the first 
spatial planning document of sorts pertaining to the EU12, as it then still was, called 
'Europe 2000' (CEC 1991) followed by 'Europe 2000+' (CEC 1994). Meanwhile, the 
ministers of spatial planning and/or regional policy (designations and the allocation of 
powers differed, and continue to differ, as between member states) started their series of 
informal meetings with one at Nantes in 1989 (Faludi/Waterhout 2002). No formation 
of the Council of Ministers dealt with the Structural Funds, and so some may have seen 
this informal meeting as a forerunner of a regional planning council. Indeed, in 1993 
and 1994, the informal ministerial meetings would style themselves as informal ministe-
rial 'councils'. However, it never came to them becoming council formations proper. To 
this present day, the status of ministerial meetings remains an issue last discussed at 
Marseille in November 2008.  
Returning to the first meeting at Nantes, the French planning agency DATAR had 
wanted to invoke spatial scenarios as a framework for improving European regional 
policy (Faludi/Peryony 2001). Aménagement du territoire places regional development 
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interventions in such a framework, so this was once again an extrapolation of French 
planning thought to the level of the Community, but it was difficult to convey the pur-
pose behind this to the other participants. Anyhow, the Italians organized a follow-up 
focusing on regional development in the periphery in 1990, and so did the Dutch with 
urban networks in the whole of Europe as their theme in 1991. By that time the Ger-
mans had started their campaign for European spatial planning to be treated as a joint 
member state responsibility, the inter-governmental rationale as formulated previously 
by the Council of Europe. Thus, German planners wanted European spatial planning to 
evolve through voluntary co-operation, as with their own so-called 'Guidelines for Re-
gional Planning' which were the joint product of the federal minister and the ministers 
of the German Länder responsible for planning (Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, 
Bauwesen und Städtebau 1993). 
This became the competence issue. Had European planning been framed successfully 
as the formulation of a spatial strategy, or spatial scenarios, to underpin the delivery of 
the Structural Funds, this issue may not have arisen4. However, once again, in particular 
the Germans framed the issue in terms of control of land use, a sovereign right of na-
tion-states. What is relevant here is that the German planners involved where nowhere 
dealing with the administration of the Structural Funds. The latter were the province of 
the economic ministry, together with the relevant ministries of the German Länder, and 
these economic policy makers kept the planners at arm's length. So land-use planning 
was all that the German planners involved had to go by. Understandably, they had no 
love, nor much feeling, for the Community's cohesion policy that spoke, not to them, 
but their national-level adversaries. Land-use planning, they insisted, was a matter for 
the member states and their subnational authorities, depending on national arrange-
ments. 
Still, the fact that this became an issue remains a puzzle. Surely, it must have been 
clear to the planners of the member states involved that this sovereign right was not put 
into question by French-style initiatives of the Commission. Conceived as a matter of 
legal rights to self-determination, sovereignty remains a well-established principle, 
unimpaired by the EU: 
"The main unresolved issue pertains to the implications (...) for autonomy in the sense 
of action possibilities – 'actual' independence or 'real' sovereignty (...): [A]ll that is ob-
vious is that the implications are contradictory and that internationalization [of which 
European integration is a part – AF] tends to deprive nation-states of some action possi-
bilities while supplying them with others" (Goldmann 2001: 181). 
Clearly, EU cohesion policy nowhere affects sovereignty in the sense above, but it 
does circumscribe what member states can do, directly by way of the conditionality of 
obtaining Structural Funds, as well as through the link with EU competition policy, and 
indirectly by changing the context in which actors operate. So, rather than any fear that 
the sovereign rights of member states might be impaired, the real purpose of the Ger-
man insistence on there being no EU competence for spatial planning – which the other 
member states, some more enthusiastically than others, eventually subscribed to – may 
have been to deprive the Commission of a means to exercise its powers more effective-
ly.  
From the moment the competence issue entered the scene, tension was ripe. Whilst 
relying on technical assistance and administrative support from the Commission, the 
                                                 
4 In fact, in 1995 the then French Presidency put such scenarios on the agenda. 
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member states were guarding against any real or imagined Commission take-over of the 
ESDP. Having sustained the process until its final conclusion at Potsdam in 1999 (CEC 
1999), the Commission called its support a day. This is when it re-framed the issue of a 
spatial framework for cohesion policy in terms of the pursuit of territorial cohesion. In 
Commission eyes the very concept of spatial planning had been tainted. Territorial co-
hesion avoids the connotations, never intended by the Commission officials concerned, 
of land-use regulation being intended. Rather, territorial cohesion policy seems a natural 
compliment to the well-established policy of the EU to foster economic and social cohe-
sion, but this is for later to discuss. 
Much has thus been made of the fact that the EU did not have a competence in mat-
ters of spatial planning5. Whether this is true is open to doubt. Gendebien has already 
been quoted for pointing out that, making use of the catch-all Article 232 of the Treaty 
of Rome, EU regional and also environmental policy have operated long before being 
enshrined in the Single European Act. It would clearly have been possible to take the 
same avenue for spatial planning. However, there was no political will to do this. There 
was consensus, however, on the need for what was called a 'spatial planning approach' 
as formulated in the ESDP: the pursuit of more coherence between sector policies as 
they were affecting space at various scales. Earlier on it was stated that, seen in this 
way, spatial planning in fact coincided with the core issue in territorial cohesion policy, 
the coherence of sector policies as regards their territorial impacts.  
The ESDP forcefully advocated the spatial planning approach. It also articulated a set 
of basic principles, similar to what the Gendebien Report had proposed: the pursuit of 
polycentric development in Europe, and also urban-rural partnership, parity of access to 
infrastructure and knowledge throughout Europe, prudent management of the natural 
and cultural heritage. On this basis, the ESDP formulated sixty policy options as a kind 
of menu for stimulating the 'Europeanization' of national, regional and local planning.  
To the minds of the Commission officials concerned, spatial planning was implied in 
the Community competence to pursue economic and social cohesion, but as reported at 
the beginning of this paper, after having made this argument forcefully, but unsuccess-
fully, at the informal meeting of ministers held in Madrid in 1995, the Commission re-
signed itself to its role of hosting meetings and facilitating the completion of the ESDP, 
a process that took another four years. 
Even though informal, the ESDP did have an, albeit diffuse influence (Waterhout 
2008). Among others, a transnational strand was added to the Community initiative IN-
TERREG which became the planners' main playground. Territorial cooperation at vari-
ous cross-border and transnational scales became routine, so much so that tens of thou-
sands of experts of various denominations are now involved in some form of 'European' 
project.  
6 Crisis  
As indicated, merely assisting with the intergovernmental ESDP had not been enough 
for an ambitious Commission. The concept of territorial, alongside with economic and 
social cohesion in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was designed to 
justify Community – and thus Commission – involvement. This was once again a 
French initiative designed in the first instance to counteract the liberalisation of public 
services considered essential to sustain the standard of living in thinly populated and de-
                                                 
5 For a comprehensive statement of German legal thinking in the matter at the time see Gatawis (2000); for a recent 
position decidedly more sympathetic to EU territorial policy see Battis/Kersten (2008). 
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populating French regions (Faludi 2006). The French Commissioner for regional policy 
at the time, Michel Barnier, turned this into the more comprehensive concept that it is 
now, and it became a stand-in for any European spatial planning for which the European 
Community was said to be lacking a competence. Importantly, reacting to the adoption 
of the Lisbon Strategy of making Europe the most competitive region globally, Barnier 
also factored competitiveness into the equation. In fact, the ESDP had already put poly-
centric development forward as a way of enhancing the competitiveness of Europe, so 
this was no break with previous thinking.  
This emphasis on competitiveness came in handy when the Sapir Report (Sapir et al. 
2004) criticised cohesion policy. Barnier must also have been instrumental in including 
territorial cohesion in the Constitution which was eventually signed in Rome in October 
2004. Its rejection by France and The Netherlands threw not just EU territorial cohesion 
policy, but the whole European project into disarray.  
While the institutional issues continued to simmer, the discussion about cohesion pol-
icy became hot, with six net-contributors to the budget led by the UK demanding a fun-
damental overhaul amounting to the renationalisation of EU regional policy. The pack-
age is a clever one. While sustaining the principle of solidarity by expressing willing-
ness to continue funding economic development, mainly but not exclusively in the new 
member states, it suggested funding for governments and their programmes rather than 
for a Commission-led policy. At the same time the package aimed at ending the practice 
of EU funding for regional policies in the richer member states, called the pumping 
around of money: net-contributors having to reclaim part of their contribution under 
Commission tutelage (Bachtler/Mendez 2007). The combined effect of giving money to 
governments and ending the practice of EU regional policy applying throughout its en-
tire territory would have the effect of eliminating the Commission as a player in re-
gional policy, hence the term renationalisation.  
This was a major issue in the negotiations on the Financial Framework 2007-2013 
ending in a late-night compromise in December 2005. The compromise left this and 
other issues unresolved, but with a commitment to review them in time for the next Fi-
nancial Framework. By that time, the Commission had already reoriented cohesion pol-
icy towards the achievement of the aims of the Lisbon Strategy of improving Europe's 
competitiveness.  
Presently, the debate on cohesion policy post-2013 is already under way, shaping the 
context in which territorial cohesion is being discussed. The other element of this con-
text is the new Treaty of Lisbon aiming to resolve the institutional issues left hanging in 
the air by the dramatic rejection of the Constitution. With its ratification, the compe-
tence issue as such has been settled, but at the same time cohesion policy is undergoing 
its review above, with the Commission pursuing territorial cohesion as one way of 
countering the imminent threat of its renationalisation. Making the pursuit of competi-
tiveness into one of its key concerns, the Commission is reorienting cohesion policy 
towards the Schumpeterian goals of the Lisbon Strategy, now in the process of being 
replaced by 'Europe 2020'.  
This is also reflected in the Territorial Agenda of the European Union (2007) (see 
also Faludi 2009) and in EU territorial cohesion policy as laid out in the Commission's 
'Green Paper' (CEC 2008). The more than 350 reactions to the Green Paper are gener-
ally supportive, stressing the need to involve regional and local authorities and stake-
holders, but also for an EU-wide strategy. Importantly, some reactions recall the 
achievements of the ESDP and wish the Commission to readmit spatial planning into 
the territorial cohesion discourse, while others draw a clear line between the two, so the 
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competence issue continues to simmer under the surface, the Lisbon Treaty's listing of 
territorial cohesion as one of the competences shared between the Union and the mem-
ber states notwithstanding.   
7 Conclusions 
Elaborating upon its programmatic approach, territorial cohesion policy could become a 
mainstay of cohesion policy after 2013. In this context it is worth recalling that the remit 
of cohesion policy extends beyond the administration of the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund. Not only are there other Structural Funds, the policy to pursue sustainable 
development and research and development are also implicated. This could be extended 
to make cohesion policy into a vehicle for coordinating all EU policies with territorial 
impact. Having said this, one needs to admit that this is a tall order, requiring daring 
initiatives, especially in view of the notorious difficulties of coordination at Brussels.  
However, the adaptability and inventiveness of the Commission should not be under-
estimated. Requested by the European Council to formulate a European Strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region in 2007, it pulled its act together, with many directorates-general 
providing an input under the leadership of the Territorial Cooperation Unit of DG Re-
gio. Already, there is talk of more of these regional strategies for the Danube River Ba-
sin, the Alpine Region and possibly also for the Mediterranean. So who knows, con-
ceived as the formulation of macro-regional strategies, spatial planning could become a 
vehicle, not only for territorial cohesion, but for EU policy generally. And, if so, interest 
in spatial planning is bound to increase. 
The new macro-regional strategies which appear to be harbingers of the future are 
certain to represent examples also of territorial governance spanning the divide between 
communautarian and member state competences. This is another pointer to the future. 
Responding to such new developments, planners need a dynamic understanding of EU 
governance, the role of space/territory in an integrating Europe, and of spatial plan-
ning/territorial cohesion policy in the context of the shifting target which is the Euro-
pean project. These are not problems that are unique to planning. In fact, experts of all 
kinds find it difficult to come to an agreement on how to approach them. However, 
there is a consensus emerging that one needs to surpass thinking in terms derived from 
the nation-state, more in particular from anachronistic ideas about how it should func-
tion, rather than how it does function under conditions of globalisation.  
The unhelpful debate about whether the EU does, or should have, a spatial planning 
competence has been but a reflection of the idea that control over territory is a defining 
characteristic of the nation-state, and that relinquishing it would undermine its sover-
eignty. This is patently untrue. Sovereign rights are not at stake, but Goldmann has been 
quoted as making the distinction between formal rights and effective control. Control 
over territory, including land use, is subject to many influences. So in exercising their 
right to regulate land use, nation states and sub-national authorities are never autono-
mous.  
A return to an idealized situation (if ever it existed) when nation states had control 
over their territory is patently impossible. In fact, what the very concept of governance 
stands for is the diffusion of control, and the need to cooperate across levels and sectors, 
with state authorities and EU institutions representing nodal points in a complex net-
work. As Allmendinger and Haughton (2009) have shown, this diffusion is a defining 
characteristic, not just of European planning, but of spatial planning in the 21st century 
generally. The European project clearly adds to this diffusion, but it is neither the root 
cause of, nor the key factor in shaping the situation. 
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As the same authors argue, the role of space/territory in this context is also in need of 
re-conceptualisation. In fact, this is implied in the above. Although legally defined ju-
risdictions continue to be the object of statutory land-use planning, they are no longer 
(as the Schuster Report still assumed as being self-evident) the most relevant, let alone 
the exclusive reference frameworks for spatial planning. Rather, spatial planning relates 
to what, with a term speaking to the imagination, Allmendinger and Haughton (2009) 
call 'soft' spaces: configurations relevant to the real and shifting ongoing processes that 
become the object of formulating spatial visions or strategies. This is like Healey (2007) 
and Davoudi and Strange (2009) basing themselves on leading-edge geographers talking 
about relative rather than absolute space. Relative space is an ad-hoc construct arising 
out of the interaction between various actors. In the discussion concerning the Green 
Paper, the Polish submission talks about these as functional areas, arguing that they, 
rather than administrative ones should form the object of territorial cohesion policy. 
In fact, if one goes not by the legal definition but by the real reach of its influence and 
responsibility, the European Union as such, too, is a 'soft' space or functional area: Be-
yond the territories of the twenty-seven members, there is the European Economic Area 
where EU law applies; there is Switzerland which is constantly negotiating its participa-
tion in the EU space; there are recognised and would-be candidates diligently trying to 
get ready for accepting EU law and in the process becoming part of EU space, or some 
aspects thereof; there is a Barcelona Space (so called after the city where it was created) 
around the Mediterranean; and there are multifarious other arrangements of a diffuse 
nature extending the reach of the EU north, south, east and west. Lastly, there is the 
highly differentiated global reach of the EU documented by Didelon, Grasland and 
Richard (2008). Not even the Eurozone is as clearly established as one might think. Be-
yond the sixteen member states that are in it, the Euro is legal tender in Kosovo and in 
Montenegro, and (like the dollar) it is increasingly accepted in other countries as well. 
Borders in the 21st Century are notoriously fuzzy!  
It seems important for planners to re-think what the planning of these 'soft' spaces in-
volves. They need to rid themselves of their fixation on statutory plans relating, as they 
do, to strictly delimited sections of the surface of the globe. Of course, authorities do 
exercise jurisdiction over clearly delimited parcels of land, and this statutory planning 
will continue to play a role, but it is no longer of the essence of spatial planning. In fact, 
it increasingly becomes the province of litigating lawyers.  
Beyond statutory planning, 'soft' spatial planning, also called 'fuzzy' (De Roo/Porter 
2007), is the order of the day. In practicing soft planning, traditional planning tools, like 
spatial analysis and 'spatial positioning' (Williams 1996), requiring the formulation of 
spatial strategies or visions, continue to be of relevance. The difference is that these are 
no longer exclusively visions for existing, 'hard' territories. Rather, there can and should 
be many spatial visions for many 'soft' spaces.  
As indicated, the soft spaces that need conceptualising include the space of the EU, 
difficult though it has been shown to define where exactly the borders of the EU are. 
Trying to conceptualise the EU territory as a whole, whilst knowing at the same time 
that, in terms of Graham and Marvin (2001), our world is splintering, maintains the idea 
of unity without which the European project would be lost.  
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